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Abstract: As any non-lump-sum tax, corporate income taxation creates distortions in 
economic choices, reducing its efficiency. This paper reviews some of these domestic and 
international distortions and their most recent estimates from the economic literature. 
Distortions originating from income shifting between capital and labour sources, profit 
shifting across jurisdictions, the effects of taxation on business location and foreign direct 
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Tax efficiency is a well-known concept in public finance. This notion is part of a 
wider debate on the principles and criteria for taxation. In particular, the equity and efficiency 
criteria are at the heart of public choices when it comes to taxation. Except for a few 
exceptions – on which we will come back – corporate taxation raises very little controversy in 
terms of equity and the debate is focussing on aspects of tax efficiency instead. Indeed, as a 
non lump-sum tax, corporate taxation introduces distortions in the choices of economic 
agents. This paper does not seek to analyse exhaustively and in details each and any of the 
economic distortions generated by corporate taxes or international differences in corporate tax 
rates and bases. This would require a more rigorous and in-depth analysis. Instead, we wish to 
draw the attention of the reader on the most important distortions and on their most recent 
estimates from the economic literature. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The second section recalls the 
role of corporate taxation and the underlying economic reasons for having corporate income 
taxation. The third section introduces the domestic distortions of corporate taxation and the 
fourth section deals with international distortions linked to business and investment location 
and to profit shifting. Conclusions follow.  
 
2. Why do we have corporate taxation? 
 
Before reviewing the distortions created by corporate taxation, it is useful to discuss 
the rationales for having a corporate income tax in the first place. Under some assumptions – 
in particular capital mobility – 'classic' economic models show that the optimal tax rate on 
capital for a small open economy is zero (Samuelson (1954), Tiebout (1956), Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986)). Therefore, questioning the usefulness of corporate 3 
taxation is a worthy exercise. Since Gordon (1992), several authors have looked into this 
question and the underlying pros and cons for the existence of corporate taxation 
(Weichenrieder (2005), de Mooij (2005), Sørensen (2007)).  
2.1. Benefit principle. 
A first reason for having a corporate income tax is linked to the benefit principle. Akin 
to individuals, companies consume public goods – in particular infrastructures – and benefit 
from public interventions – such as education of workers or a judiciary system based on the 
rule-of-law. Therefore, it would seem normal that companies pay taxes as a compensation for 
those services. Some authors also argue that limited liability enjoyed by companies is an 
advantage that calls for a compensating tax. Those standpoints, even though attractive, are 
sometimes challenged because of the weak and rather indirect link between the use of those 
services and the determination of the corporate tax base, because companies are owned in fine 
by individuals who are also taxed, therefore introducing a risk of double-taxation, and because 
there are probably more direct ways of internalising the cost of the provision of those public 
goods, notably via user fees.  
2.2. Tax exporting. 
 
A second argument is based on questioning the assumption of perfect mobility of 
capital. Mobility is a much more complex topic in the real world than models suggest. 
Because of sunk costs or relocation costs, capital may sometimes be relatively immobile. It is 
the same if, as suggested by Lee (1997), there are complementarities between capital and a 
less mobile factor. For example, money on a bank account (in theory mobile) may be used to 
pay workers of a mining company (therefore immobile). If, in addition, a non-negligible share 
of companies are owned by foreign shareholders, tax authorities have an incentive to tax these 
companies and 'export' the tax burden on those shareholders (Mintz (1994), Huizinga and 
Nielsen (1997)). Wildasin (2003) develops such a model with convex costs of relocating 4 
capital (increasing with speed of relocation). He shows that the optimal capital tax rate at 
equilibrium is proportional to the share of foreign shareholding and inversely proportional to 
the degree of capital mobility. In an empirical study covering 34 European countries between 
1996 and 2000, Huizinga and Nicodème (2006) show a strong positive relationship between 
the share of foreign shareholding in a country and the average corporate tax burden. Their 
estimate indicates that increasing the share of foreign ownership by one percentage point 
increases the average tax rate on companies by .43 percentage points on average. Imperfect 
capital mobility coupled with non-negligible foreign ownership would therefore explain the 
existence of corporate taxation.  
2.3. Treasury effects. 
A third rationale is linked to so-called treasury effects generated by foreign tax credits. 
Several large countries such as the US and the UK apply tax credit systems to relief double-
taxation on foreign income. Take a US multinational with a Belgian subsidiary. This 
subsidiary makes profit that is taxed at the Belgian corporate income tax at 33.99%. When the 
US parent repatriates the profit of the subsidiary, the dividend is taxed at the US federal 
corporate tax rate of 35%1. The US Company nevertheless receives a foreign tax credit of 
33.99 on the tax already paid in Belgium, which it fully uses. The total tax burden is therefore 
35% and fully determined by the tax rate applicable in the US. This example shows that with 
foreign tax credit systems in home countries, host countries are free to set their tax rates at the 
desired level (as long as they stay under the level of the home country) without having an 
impact on the total tax burden paid on repatriated dividends.  
2.4. Erosion of personal income taxes. 
A fourth argument is that corporate taxation is useful to avoid the attrition of personal 
income taxation. Indeed, in the absence of corporate income tax, it would be interesting for 
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individuals to incorporate and therefore avoid taxes on their income. Corporate taxation is 
hence considered to be a backstop for personal income taxation. We will come back to this 
point.  
2.5. Political constraints. 
Finally, political constraints may play an important role. Corporations are often 
perceived by public opinion as entities making large profit and owned by wealthy investors, 
which generally qualifies them in the eyes of public opinion to bear an important share of the 
tax burden. In fact, corporate taxes represent only 3.4% of GDP for the EU-27 in 2006 and 
8.5% of total tax collected.  The corporate tax base is also smaller than the personal income 
tax base or the VAT base for example2.  
 
3. Domestic distortions. 
 
3.1. Deadweight loss. 
A first approach to evaluate economic distortions generated by corporate income 
taxation is to compute the deadweight loss (or Harberger Triangle). It represents the 
difference between the losses in consumer and producer surpluses and the tax collected. As a 
first proxy, deadweight loss as a percentage of tax collected is given by the formula tε/2, 
where t is the corporate tax rate and ε is the elasticity of the base to the rate. In 2008, the 
average corporate tax rate in the EU is 23.6%. In their study on profit shifting in Europe, 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) estimate the elasticity of the corporate tax base to the rate at .45. 
This gives a deadweight loss in percentage of tax collected of 5.3%.  
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3.2. Administrative and compliance costs. 
Administrative and compliance costs are important elements of tax efficiency. These 
costs are complex to estimate and very few data is available. They have been estimated at 
10% of the collected tax in the US, of which 1% represents the administrative costs (Aaron 
and Gale (1983), Slemrod and Sorum (1984)). This estimate is comparable to similar studies 
that find administrative costs of 1.16% for the UK (Godwin, 1995), 1.1% for Australia (Pope, 
1995), 1.6% for France, .5% for the US, .52% for Sweden, .89% for Spain (Carmona, Guiffès 
and Lépine, 2006) and 1.53% for Czech Republic (Vitek and Pubal, 2002). 
These costs vary also with the tax considered. For the UK, Godwin (1995) finds 
administrative costs of .52% of collected taxes for corporate taxation, to be compared with 
1.53% for personal income tax and social security contributions, 1.03% for VAT, .25% for 
customs duties, and .12% for taxes on fuels. For the Netherlands, de Kam (1998) finds 
relatively high ratios of 36.4% for wealth taxes, 17.6% for customs duties, 7.1% for 
environmental taxes, 6.2% for VAT, 5.1% for corporate taxation, and 4.8% for personal 
income taxation.  Finally, in a study covering 700 EU companies, the European Commission 
(2004) finds ratios of 1.9% and 30.9% for large companies and SMEs respectively. 
Obviously, measures vary with the estimation technique, in particular with the assumptions on 
how to share common costs. Furthermore, those measures are averages and do not say 
anything on the marginal administrative cost of taxes. 
3.3 Distortions generated by reduced corporate tax rates. 
As political economy instrument, corporate taxation has been at the heart of debates 
about its neutrality vis-à-vis the size of companies. Many countries indeed apply reduced 
corporate tax rates for SMEs. Two debates are being hold. The first one is about the rationale 
for having differentiated tax rates for SMEs. The second debate, which we will not discuss in 7 
this paper, is linked to whether large companies pay a fair share of the tax burden3. Those two 
questions refer to both the equity and the efficiency aspects of corporate taxation.  
The wish of tax authorities to implement measures to decrease the tax burden of SMEs 
may find its rationales in trying to reach the most efficient allocation of resources. Some 
market failures may indeed be detrimental to SMEs and authorities might be tempted to 
compensate them, possibly by using taxation (OECD, 1994). First, SME may have difficulties 
to access credit and may suffer from higher interest rates because of asymmetry of 
information regarding their financial situation, a lack of reputation because of their small size, 
and because of possible differences in their obligations compared to large companies with 
regards to informing investors, for example in accounting practices (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Maksimovic, 2005). Next, it is possible that SMEs face higher difficulties to create 
economies of scale, which generates higher average costs and a lower profitability. Third, 
SMEs may also face larger difficulties to meet their needs in terms of highly-skilled staff 
because of a lack of visibility, which may decrease their performance. In addition to these 
market failures, SMEs may also suffer from regulatory failures due to complex taxation 
systems. This complexity and their relative lack of expertise may put them in a more difficult 
position than large companies when trying to optimise their tax burden.  
According to the OECD (1994), the arguments in favour of reduced corporate tax rates 
for SMEs are nevertheless weak. In particular, the measures to be taken may even make 
legislation been more complex, which increases costs for SMEs. Reduced corporate tax rates 
may also create distortions vis-à-vis the size of companies and act as a disincentive to grow. 
Alternative measures such as direct aid or a better functioning of credit markets are 
considered as more efficient.  
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3.4. Distortions generated by a shift to labour. 
Another important distortion created by corporate taxation is the one induced on 
labour markets. This distortion is well-known in theory but is generally absent from the 
political debate. Economic theory shows that, under the assumption of mobility of capital, the 
incidence of the corporate tax is fully borne by labour (Gordon, 1986). Furthermore, this 
literature insists that capital flight reduces labour productivity and, in fine, wages. Hence, this 
creates an additional distortion which could be avoided if labour would be taxed directly.  
Recently, Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini (2007) have investigated this issue 
using a panel of more than 50,000 companies in nine European countries over 1996-2003. 
Their results suggest a validation of the theory as each additional euro of corporate tax 
reduces wages by 92 eurocents in the long-run. Therefore, the incidence of corporate taxation 
falls almost entirely on labour. 
3.5. Distortions created by a shift from personal to corporate income taxes.. 
One last domestic economic distortion is linked to the possibility for some agents to 
requalify their labour income into capital income and vice versa. It is indeed possible for 
entrepreneurs to incorporate and to substitute in this way their labour income with corporate 
income, which is taxed at lower rates. This issue has mainly been studied for the United 
States. Makie-Mason and Gordon (1997) use data on the share of companies in capital 
between 1956 and 1986 and find that this share is positively influenced by the difference 
between the personal income tax and corporate income tax rates when companies are making 
profit. Goolsbee (2004) carries out a sectoral study for the US in 1992 and finds that an 
increase in the corporate tax rate by a tenth of a percent decreases the share of incorporated 
companies in the total number of firms by .25 percentage points and their share in sales and 
employment by .07 and .15 percentage points respectively. 9 
For Europe, studies show similar effects. Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002) look at the 
share of corporate savings in total savings for 17 OECD countries between 1985 and 1997 and 
find that this share is positively related to the difference between personal and corporate 
income tax rates. Their results suggest that for each reduction in the corporate tax rate by one 
percentage-point, the share of corporate savings increases by 2.6%. Recently, de Mooij and 
Nicodème (2008) have used data on incorporation covering 17 European countries and 60 
sectors between 1997 and 2003. Their study shows that the difference between the two tax 
rates exerts a significant positive impact on incorporation. The semi-elasticity in their study is 
1, meaning that an increase by one percentage-point in the difference between the two rates 
leads on average to an increase in incorporation by 1%.  
This result has important consequences for tax policy. Between 12 and 21% of 
corporate income tax collected can be attributed to the difference between the average 
personal and corporate income tax rates. This difference is about 21 percentage points for 
Europe. Its increase has contributed to increase the ratio of corporate tax collected on GDP by 
.25%. Next, it also means that some of the consequences of corporate tax competition will 
materialise into an erosion of personal income taxes as many entrepreneurs take advantage of 
decreasing corporate tax rates to incorporate. The estimates by de Mooij and Nicodème 
(2008) show the importance of this distortion as each ex-ante increase of corporate taxes by 1 
euro bring only 76 cents. The difference is shifted to personal income taxes.  
 
4. International distortions. 
 
The efficiency of corporate income taxation and the distortions it generates are even 
more acute in an international context. The concepts of capital import neutrality and capital 
export neutrality are useful guides in this respect. Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) states that 
the tax burden shall be independent from the location of activities that generate taxable profit. 10 
This is for example the case for residence-based taxation which will tax a specific investor at 
the same rate for all his/her investment wherever they occur. Location decisions are therefore 
not affected by taxes and, provided the pre-tax rate of return is the same everywhere, taxes 
will not distort capital allocation decisions. However, investors located in different countries 
will face different post-tax rates of return. Inversely, Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) states 
that the tax burden shall not depend on the location of investors. This is for example the case 
of source-based taxes. In this case, the post-tax rates of returns of all investors doing business 
in one specific country will be equalised. However, the location of investment across 
countries will be affected by taxes. It is widely admitted that, in application of the production 
efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Capital Export Neutrality is preferable to 
Capital Import Neutrality. 
Nevertheless, Devereux (2008) underlines that, in a global economy, these principles 
can only be reached by achieving full harmonisation. Hence, far from reaching neutrality, 
corporate taxation also creates distortions at the international level. To categorise these 
distortions, it is useful to start with a decision tree for companies as the one defined in 
Devereux (2007). In this framework, companies face four consecutive decisions. First, 
companies need to decide whether to produce at home and export or to produce abroad. This 
decision seems to be largely independent from tax considerations. Second, conditioned to 
having decided to produce abroad, companies need to decide in which country to locate 
foreign production. Average effective corporate tax rates seem to influence this decision. 
Next, conditioned on the two previous choices, companies need to decide how much to invest 
in the chosen country. Marginal effective corporate tax rates seem to have an influence on this 
outcome. Finally, conditioned to the three previous choices, the last decision is where to show 
taxable profit by shifting it across jurisdictions. Here, statutory corporate tax rates may have 
an impact. We will now review distortions linked to these choices.  11 
4.1. Distortions linked to company location. 
Many factors determine the location of foreign subsidiaries, such as market size, 
labour costs, productivity, legal environment or distance to home country. However, 
Devereux and Griffith (1998) analyse location decisions of US Multinationals in four 
European countries between 1980 and 1994 and show that location choice are also influenced 
by average effective tax rates. Buettner and Ruf (2007) find that statutory tax rates influenced 
location decisions of German multinationals in 18 European countries between 1996 and 
2003. Overesch and Wamser (2008) also find a similar result for the location of these German 
Multinationals in ten new Member States between 2004 and 2007, using the average 
corporate effective tax rate. 
A growing economic literature shows that international rules for taxation of cross-
border operations play an important role. This is for example the case for tax credits (see 
Hines, 1996). In a recent paper, Barrios, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008) analyse the 
decisions of European groups on where to locate foreign subsidiaries, using the various 
aspects of international taxation. They find that both the local tax in the host country and the 
tax in the home country matter. The analysis of the impact of corporate taxation on the 
location of companies requires the use of regression models for limited dependent variables, 
such as probit and logit models, which makes interpretation of results more difficult. 
However, using preliminary results from Barrios, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008), a 
one percentage-point increase in the effective4 tax rate of companies (i.e. from a sample 
average of 35.3% to 36.3%) reduces the probability to locate a foreign subsidiary in a specific 
country by 3.96%, all other things equal. This coefficient is only 2.93% if one takes into 
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account the host country tax rate only, which confirms that doing so underestimates the 
impact of taxation on business location. 
4.2. Distortions to investment. 
The link between taxation and foreign direct investment has been the subject of a 
myriad of studies that differ in the tax variables considered, the FDI data used and the 
estimation techniques. It is therefore unsurprising that their results show a large variation. De 
Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2006) carry out a meta-analysis of these many studies and find a 
mean value of 2.9 for the semi-elasticity of foreign direct investment to effective corporate tax 
rates. This means that increasing the corporate effective tax rate by one percentage point 
would decrease foreign direct investment by 2.9% 
Following the technique of de Mooij (2005), we can estimate the size of this 
distortion. Under the hypothesis that foreign investment does not crowd out domestic 
investment, the effect of an increase in corporate taxation shall exclusively materialise in 
decreased foreign direct investment. According to Huizinga and Nicodème (2006), the share 
of foreign ownership in the total assets of companies in Europe is 21.1%. This means that a 
one percentage point increase in the effective corporate tax rate will reduce the corporate tax 
base by .61% (i.e. -2.9 x 21.1%). Furthermore, de Mooij (2005) finds that a one percentage 
point increase in the statutory corporate tax rate leads on average to an increase in the 
effective corporate tax rate by .88%. If one applies this value, a one percentage-point increase 
in the statutory effective tax rate shall decrease the corporate tax base by .54% (i.e. .61% x 
.88). Since, the corporate tax base is taxed on average at 23.6%, this means that the ex-post 
loss in taxes is 12.7% of the ex-ante collected tax revenues (i.e. .54 x 23.6%). In other words, 
an ex-ante increase in the corporate statutory tax rate by one percentage-point will lead to an 
increase in tax collected by .873% only when taking into account the reduction in foreign 
direct investment.  13 
4.3. Distortions due to profit shifting.  
Finally, profit shifting across jurisdiction constitutes one important sources of 
distortion, but also one that is difficult to analyse. Several authors, among which Grubert and 
Muti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) show that there is a negative correlation between 
reported corporate profit and the corporate tax rate of the country where the profit is reported. 
This suggests that Multinationals have the possibility to transfer profit within the corporate 
group from high-tax countries to the low-tax jurisdictions.  
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use a panel of company data in 21 European countries to 
estimate the size and cost of profit shifting activities. Their estimates confirm that profit 
shifting activities are sizeable, varying from a gain corresponding to 22.4% of the corporate 
tax base for Hungary (but computed on a small tax base) to a loss of 13.6% for Germany. 
Whereas Grubert and Muti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) estimate the semi-elasticity of 
the corporate tax base to corporate tax rate at -2.3 and -2.5 respectively, Huizinga and Laeven 
(2008) find a lower value of -1.31. This suggests that each increase in the statutory corporate 
tax base by one percentage point decreases reported profit by multinationals by 1.31%. It is 
arduous to estimate the percentage of companies that, being part of a group, have the 
possibility to transfer their profit. De Mooij (2005) estimated this percentage at 50% for The 
Netherlands. From Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008), we see that this ratio seems to be 
applicable to Europe5, which would mean that an ex-ante increase of the corporate tax rate by 
one percentage-point leads to a 'tax flight' of about 17.2% of the planned tax collection (i.e. 
1.31% x 50% x 26.3%). This is a sizeable distortion.  
Profit shifting occurs via several channels. For instance, companies may artificially 
transfer debt. A company located in a low-tax country may lend to a related company located 
in a high-tax country. This latter will pay interest – taxed at a lower corporate tax rate – to the 
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first and can deduct these payments from its taxable profit (that is subject to a high corporate 
tax rate). At the level of the group, the total tax burden will be reduced thanks to this profit 
shifting. Several studies analyse this phenomenon, in particular for the United States 
(MacKie-Mason (1990), Gordon and Lee (2001), Graham (2000)). Some other studies look at 
the debt policy of Multinationals with parent companies or subsidiaries in the US (Hines and 
Hubbard (1990), Collins and Shackelford (1992), Froot and Hines (1992), Grubert (1998), 
Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)) and find that their debt 
policy is consistent with tax-minimizing strategies. 
Analysing a panel of German multinational companies, Ramb and Weichenrieder 
(2004), Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) and Overesch and Wamser (2008) all find a positive 
effect of the tax rate on the leverage of companies. Jog and Tang (2001) for Canadian data 
and Moore and Ruane (2005) for European data also find such an impact. Huizinga, Laeven 
and Nicodème (2008) use company data for 32 European countries between 1994 and 2003. 
They link debt policy with effective taxation of companies, taking into account the rules 
applicable to international taxation. Their results suggest that for stand-alone companies, an 
increase in the effective tax rate by one percentage-point increases the ratio of debt to assets 
by .18%. The impact is larger for Multinationals as it reaches .24% for two equal-size 
companies (with one foreign subsidiary) within the same group. The estimates by Overesch 
and Wamser (2008), Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) and Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème 
(2008) are very similar in size. 
The other important channel for shifting profit across jurisdictions is transfer pricing. 
Those refer to prices and rates applicable to intra-group operations. By applying intra-group 
prices and rates that differ from market conditions, multinational groups are able to increase 
or decrease reported profit in specific countries. Despite strict regulations and monitoring by 
tax authorities, the economic literature has found that some empirical results are in line with 15 
the existence of such practices. For example, Clausing (1993, 2003) and Swensson (2001) 
find evidence of transfer pricing activities for a panel of US multinationals. Barteslman and 
Beetsma (2003) find similar results for 22 OECD countries between 1979 and 1997. Their 





Corporate taxation has fuelled many debates about both its usefulness and odds of 
survival and the distortions it creates. Those are of both domestic and international nature. A 
review of the empirical economic literature ranks income shifting between capital and labour 
sources at the top of the list of distortions. Profit shifting across jurisdictions set up another 
source of distortions. Finally, the effects of taxation on business location and foreign direct 
investment are a third source of distortions. 16 
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